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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper examines piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Mexico, under the framework of
maritime security. The results indicate that piratic attacks are most likely underreported by the
Government of Mexico. The research findings documented fourteen attacks on supply vessels
and offshore platforms for the first half of 2020; only three relevant attacks were officially
reported in the same period by the vessel´s (foreign) flag jurisdiction. However, the Maritime
Authority of Mexico did not change the security level at any of the ports or territorial sea during
the incidents. The maritime security level remained the same (level 1) during 2020, despite
several alerts launched by the international maritime community. Recommendations by the
respondents (shipmasters, SSO, CSO and PFSO) recommended that a permanent increased
security level (level 2) should be implemented in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico until
this specific problem is resolved. Participants suggested additional special measures to tackle
the problem including the evaluation to class the area as a High Risk Area (HRA) and the
establishment of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), for international cooperation and
capacity building with the US Coastguard authorities to promote necessary collaboration
towards effectively dealing with these security threats.
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Introduction
Piracy and armed robbery attacks against vessels at
anchoring areas of ports in the Southern Gulf of
Mexico and oil platforms located in the region have
increased significantly during the last three years. Only
during the first seven months of 2020, research efforts
have documented 14 piratical attacks, but only 3 of
them were officially reported to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) by the attacked vessel’s
flag jurisdiction and not by Mexico, the State where
these incidents occurred.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS) Code, is one of the most important sets of maritime
security regulations of international law, developed by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These pro
visions are established in Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life
at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS Convention) and include
crucial instruments to fight piracy, armed robbery and
other type of transnational organized crime at sea, as the
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and respective
Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), and the Ship Security
Assessment (SSA) and Ship Security Plan (SSP). These
solutions include a series of protocols for awareness and
actions, to respond to security threats at sea, including
piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, illegal trafficking of
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drugs, weapons, and illegal migration. The ISPS Code is
a “comprehensive set of measures to enhance the secur
ity of ships and port facilities, developed in response to
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States”
(International Maritime Organization 2012).
Part A of the Code establishes mandatory provi
sions; the not mandatory (“recommended”) part
B encompasses guidelines explaining how to better
comply with the mandatory requirements of part
A. In any case, core instruments of the ISPS Code are
security incident reports and security incident investi
gation, as well as the IMO register of pirate attacks and
armed robbery against vessels. Meeting the obligation
on the part of States to report piratical attacks to IMO is
vital in order to maintain transparent and reliable sta
tistics, which are crucial as the first step in the response
chain for allocation of resources by authorities and
international organizations to tackle piracy.
Section 12.2, subsection 8 of the ISPS Code, establishes
that among other duties and responsibilities of the Ship
Security Officer (SSO) it is necessary to report all security
incidents, which must be reported both to the maritime
administration of the coastal State where the incident
occurred and to the maritime authority of the vessel’s
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flag jurisdiction. Furthermore, Section 17.2 establishes the
duties and responsibilities of the Port Facility Security
Officer (PFSO), including “reporting to the relevant autho
rities and maintaining records of occurrences which threa
ten the security of the port facility”.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017) have pointed
out that the analysis of security incidents’ root causes is the
cornerstone of “updating” the relevant security assessment,
which was previously used as the base for the development
of the security plan, with the aim to remove any loopholes.
Additionally, if security officers identify new security threats,
they must also implement the necessary adjustments.
Cutting a long way short, “it is crucial to keep security incident
records updated”, as the first indicator that there is room for
further improvement.
Designated Maritime Authorities have already speci
fied the type of maritime and port security incidents that
must be immediately reported to them for official inves
tigation in certain countries. Indicative examples include
terror attacks; bomb warnings; hijack, armed robbery
against a ship; discovery of firearms, drugs, weapons
and explosives and unauthorized access to port facilities
and restricted areas. In addition, security threats, breaches
of security and security incidents, including date, time,
location, response to them and the person-authorities to
whom they were reported must be recorded and docu
mented in the security incidents records (International
Maritime Organization 2012).
Then, maritime authorities from member States have
the obligation to report acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships to IMO, according to the MSC/Circ.623/
Rev.3,1 as approved by the Maritime Safety Committee,
at its eighty-sixth session of June 2009. At the same time,
they must conduct a maritime security incident investiga
tion, which shall run parallel to the judicial investigation
concerning the crime. The objective of such investigation
is that the entire maritime community can learn the
lesson and understand the causal factors of why
a particular incident happened, preventing similar inci
dents from reoccurring, avoiding similar mistakes in the
future. It must be highlighted that in the case of very
serious security incidents, as pirate attacks and armed
robbery against vessels there must be a reassessment of
the PFSA/SSA and adjustment of the PFSP/SSP, accord
ingly, as required by the ISPS Code, which includes the
increase of security levels.
As highlighted by Nordfjeld (2018), the IMO, has
established three different security levels:
(1) Security Level 1(normal) requires the minimum
protective security measures at all times,
(2) Security Level 2, which requires that additional
protective security measures shall be main
tained for a period of time as a result of the
heightened risk or a security incident and,
1

(3) Security Level 3, which requires specific protec
tive security measures which shall last only for
a limited period of time when risk for a security
incident is probable or imminent, even when it
is not possible to identify the target.
Security Level 3 involves the strictest security measures
and its priority is the security of the port, port facilities,
vessels and society that may be affected by a security
incident and may result in the suspension of commercial
operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred
to the government or other organizations responsible for
dealing with significant security threats/incidents.
The ISPS Code establishes that the process of set
ting security levels focuses on the alert for the per
ceived risk of terrorism attacks, but Member States can
include other security threats in their risk assessment
like pirate attacks and armed robbery against vessels
and oil platforms. Maritime Security levels apply to
ships sailing over the territorial sea and port facilities.
However, governments can implement different secur
ity levels for different ports, port facilities and different
areas of their territorial waters.
In any case, the change of security levels must be
communicated to the port, its port terminals and ves
sels attempting to call that port or port facilities, as well
as vessels in transit or attempting to transit those
waters. The Maritime Authority must ensure that
other relevant authorities and interested parties as
terminal operators, ship owners, Flag Administration,
P&I clubs and insurance´s representatives are notified
in the case of serious security incidents as armed rob
bery against vessels, and that they are given instruc
tions about how to handle evidence material for the
subsequent security incident investigation.

Research objectives
The objectives of this paper are the following:
(1) To study current security risks related to piracy
and armed robbery against vessels and oil plat
forms in the Southern Gulf of Mexico;
(2) To examine the response of the Maritime Authority
concerning setting and change of maritime security
levels as part of the response chain of the Maritime
Authority from the Mexican Government to tackle
pirate attacks and armed robbery;
(3) To analyse the impact of the lack of the imple
mentation of a maritime transport policy with
particular focus on a maritime security policy,
including the respective allocation of resources.
The scope of the research study is on the Southern Gulf
of Mexico; however, it can be applicable to other

Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews for preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
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countries facing similar security threats and insecurity
levels in the Latin American region, where there has
also been registered malpractices concerning the offi
cial report of pirate attacks and armed robbery against
ships.

Theoretical background
Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships
Article 101 from the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1982, establishes sev
eral conditions for what type of unlawful actions can
be considered piracy. These conditions include that
the incident must involve violence, detention or depre
dation and that it must occur on the high seas, outside
the jurisdiction of any Government, as observed in the
definition below:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or
a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or air
craft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in
a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(a) any act of voluntary participation in the
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft;
(b) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating
an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
A certain number of pirate attacks occur within terri
torial waters of different countries around the globe.
There was an extensive disagreement among shipowners and other shareholders with this definition
since it left outside those incidents registered in the
waters of a national jurisdiction. The Maritime
International Bureau published their own definition of
piracy, which disregarded the issue about this. As
a response the Maritime Safety Committee, from IMO
approved the revised circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 to
revoke MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 on guidance to shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews for pre
venting and suppressing acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships, at its eighty-sixth session, held
from 27 May to 5 June 2009.
The revision was carried out on the guidance
provided by IMO taking into consideration the
work of the correspondence group on the review
and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/
Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by
MSC 84.
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Under the new circular, the definition of “armed
robbery against ships” was restructured, to reflect the
view of France and other States articulating that the
definition for armed robbery against ships should not
be applicable to incidents committed seaward of the
territorial sea. Also the motive of the act “private ends”
was added.
The new definition reads: “Armed robbery against
ships” means any unlawful act of violence or detention
or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than
an act of piracy, committed for private ends and direc
ted against a ship or against persons or property on
board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea”. The
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) accepted both
definitions and started to apply them in their register
of security incidents from the IMB Piracy Reporting
Centre, which is manned 24 hours to receive and reg
ister reports of attacks or attempted attacks
worldwide.
Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 establishes that in addition
to hijacking of ships, holding of the crew hostage, and
the theft of cargo, other targets of the attackers
include cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions and
any portable ship’s equipment and that therefore, the
effective application of the ISPS Code is important and
strongly encouraged.
It also encompasses a series of recommended prac
tices suggested to owners or masters of ships operat
ing in areas where attacks occur, which are based on
reports of incidents, advices published by commercial
organizations and measures developed to enhance
ship security.

The ISPS code
The ISPS Code is an international regulation developed
upon theories of risk management to secure ports,
vessels, their crews and the marine environment,
where information about threats, impacts and vulner
abilities are used to assess the residual risk.
Concerning maritime security Capt. Hesse (2003),
wrote that the rationale behind the new chapter XI-2
and the ISPS Code of the SOLAS conventions is the
approach of a risk management activity by determin
ing which security measures are appropriate and
necessary upon a risk assessment for each particular
case. He added that the purpose of the ISPS Code is to
pride a standardised framework for the evaluation of
risk to enable governments to offset changes in threat
levels according to changes in vulnerability of ships
and port facilities. Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld (2018) con
firmed that “The ISPS Code represents a structural
change in port and maritime security management and
should be seen as a basic framework for port and mar
itime security, and international cooperation, covering
specific standardised security measures”.
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The ISPS Code demands the development of a ship/
port security assessment and the respective security
plan prepared through a six stage assessment, which
are the following: (a) Pre-assessment; (b) threat assess
ment; (c) impact assessment; (d) vulnerability assess
ment; (e) risk scoring and; (f) risk management. The
internationally known formula for risk is used, as fol
lows: RISK = THREAT X IMPACT X VULNERABILITY.
The IMO (2012) has recognised as “high”, a residual
risk score of 27 or more, which is considered unaccep
table, and thus the ship/port must seek and implement
additional control measures. While a residual risk score
of between 8 and 24 has been declared as “medium”,
which requires management monitoring; a residual
risk score of 6 or less is considered as “low” or “toler
able risk”, where no further control measures are
needed.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld
and
Dalaklis
(2017)
explained that the ISPS Code “only applies to passenger
ships, high speed passenger vessels and cargo vessels of
500 gross tonnage and upwards. As well as Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in transit and at ports
(but not to fixed and floating platforms and MODUs on
the oil field); and all type of port facilities serving vessels
offered for international voyages”. The authors
remarked that the “extent to which the guidelines
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its
cargo and number of passengers, as well as its sailings
routes and the features of the port of or port facilities
visited by that specific ship. Regarding the application of
guidelines to port facilities, it will depend on the type of
carriages and vessels visiting that particular facility and
its ordinary trading routes”.
As Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld (2018), correctly pointed
out, the ISPS Code does not apply to offshore activities.
The IMO has left it up to member States to decide
whether to extend its application to fixed Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) and floating oil plat
forms, located in the Continental Shelf. The referred
author recommended that for the case of Mexico and
taking into consideration its level of offshore activities
related to oil and gas exploration and production, they
should develop their own regulation extending the
application of the ISPS Code security measures to ves
sels engaged in offshore activities, MODUs on location
and to fixed and floating platforms.
According to the ISPS Code, the Ship Security
Assessment and the Ship Security Plan must both
include written procedures on measures to prevent
or suppress pirate attacks and armed robbery.
Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 from IMO establishes that all
ships operating in waters or ports where there has
been registered piracy and armed robbery against
vessels should carry out a security assessment as
a preparation for development of measures to prevent
an attack. The security assessment should take into
account the following aspects:

(1) “the risks that may be faced including any infor
mation given on characteristics of piracy or armed
robbery in the specific area;
(2) the ship’s actual size, freeboard, maximum speed,
and the type of cargo;
(3) the number of crew members available, their pro
ficiency and training;
(4) the ability to establish secure areas on board ship;
and
(5) the equipment on board, including any surveil
lance and detection equipment that has been
provided.
(6) The ship security plan or emergency response pro
cedures should be prepared based on the risk
assessment, detailing predetermined responses to
address increases and decreases in threat levels”,
IMO (2009b).

Ocean governance
Ocean governance means the coordination of various
uses of the ocean and protection of the marine envir
onment. It is also defined as the necessary process to
sustain ecosystem structure and functions (Pyć 2016).
This author adds that an effective ocean governance
requires the implementation of globally-agreed inter
national rules and procedures, regional actions based
on common principles, and national legal frameworks
and integrated policies.
These policies shall include aspects related to mar
itime security as port and maritime security, piracy,
terrorism, transnational organized crime, illegal migra
tion, unlawful fisheries and proliferation of drugs and
weapons. Some of the most substantial challenges of
an effective ocean governance are associated to mar
itime security.
The United Nation Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal framework for
national sovereignty rights and international obliga
tions at sea. It also serves as the fundament for regional
security cooperation, which is crucial to maintain safe
and secure oceans and to protect the marine
environment.

National maritime security policy
The Cambridge Dictionary (2020) defines policy as
“a set of ideas or a plan for action followed by
a business, a government, a political party, or a group
of people”. It is also the driving force of an Organization
(international, governmental, or non-governmental),
guiding its decisions according to a strategic plan,
generating rules etc., but differing from rules or law
and therefore it must not be confused with politics.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
from the United Nations highlights the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets (adopted
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by world leaders in September 2015) build on the
previous Millennium Development Goals aiming to
achieve what the previous did not succeed. The 17
SDGs apply to all countries worldwide, which must
integrate them into their national policies.
As part of the United Nations, the IMO is working
towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and the associated SDGs. Certainly,
most of the SDGs can be linked directly or indirectly
to maritime transport, as a natural facilitator of the
world trade and global economy. “While SDG 14 is
central to IMO, aspects of the Organization’s work
can be linked to all individual SDGs, (IMO, 2020a).
The Development and implementation of a Maritime
(Transport) Policy fortifies the maritime capacity, as well as
the correct administration and exploitation of marine
resources and appropriate protection of the marine envir
onment, which contributes to the achievement of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs). While a maritime
policy is wide encompassing, a National Maritime Transport
Policies (NMTP) deals with specific maritime transport issues
for a particular State following its national characteristics,
challenges and interests.
A NMTP must include strategies and plans for the
ocean/maritime governance, which shall be over
arched by the national interests, based on
a sustainable development, including an integrated
coastal zone management. As well as the juridical
framework, encompassing both the international and
national dimension, which must reflect its sectoral
interests established in the guidelines and principles
of the ocean/maritime governance, which must follow
its constitution, laws and regulations.
On this context, a National Maritime Security Policy
(NMSP) is the part of the NMTP with own plans, strategies,
human and material resources and guidelines aimed to
secure its ports, the ports assets, its users, maritime share
holders and its waters including its marine resources as well
as vessels and their crews transiting its waters.
As mentioned before, one of the biggest challenges of
an effective ocean governance are related to maritime
security. Thus, it is a prerequisite to develop and implement
a NMTP, including the essential part of the NMSP, since it
requires international cooperation to face threats as piracy,
maritime terrorism and armed robbery against vessels, bear
ing in mind that securing oceans and the marine environ
ment is an international duty, as it is the combat against
transnational organized crime. The NMSP must also follows
national and international regulations and particularly the
ISPS Code.

Methodological approach
The research methodology includes semi-structured
interviews conducted to Ship Security Officers (SSO)
and Company Security Officers (CSO) working in the
Southern Gulf of Mexico on board vessels or shipping
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companies with vessels sailing in that region. From the
twenty persons invited to participate five of them
rejected the invitation. Qualitative semi-structured
interviews, based on a questionnaire encompassing
30 different questions were employed to allow new
viewpoints to emerge freely, particularly about opi
nions and perceptions on security threats.
The purpose of the study was described to participants
in an information cover-sheet letter where the research
objectives were clearly described, explaining that their par
ticipation was voluntary, confidential and without any eco
nomic contribution or gifts. The total number of interviewed
participants was 15 persons, all of them practicing in areas
of maritime security. The interviews were conducted in MayJune 2020, taped recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data
was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and
themes were identified and coded using thematic analysis
and constant comparison of data.
The selection of methods was chosen because of its
suitability in both, law and social sciences, disciplines
where they are widely used, in accordance with the explora
tory nature of topics related to security and criminology.
They were considered appropriate for this case, where one
of the general objectives is to study the diverse risks related
to piracy and armed robbery against vessels and oil plat
forms in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, as well as the
response of the Maritime Authority of Mexico to tackle
this kind of security threats.
McCracken (1988) stated that structured and semistructured questionnaires with open questions, can
help the researcher to avoid being obtrusive and enga
ging in active listening strategies during the interview
and enables to give order to the different subjects
during the interviews, which simplify data analysis
while developing categories or themes.
The research also employed the classical documen
tal analysis to investigate the number of pirate attacks
and armed robbery against vessels that occurred in the
mentioned area during the period of 1 January–
30 July 2020. The document analysis is based on data
collected on armed robbery against vessels for 2020 in
the Gulf of Mexico and particularly in the southern part
of the gulf.
Representatives from the Secretariat of the Navy of
Mexico were also asked to participate in the research
effort, but they did not provide any respond to the
invitation. Thus, researchers used press releases, media
articles and document analysis to further analyse the
response from the Maritime Authority to this growing
problem in the Campeche Sound.

Results
On the basis of the semi-structured interviews 15
themes were identified. They reflect a rather poor
response from the Maritime Authority of Mexico to
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the security threats that affect the Southern Gulf of
Mexico. These themes are the following:
(1) Authorities from the Secretariat of the Navy
(SEMAR) are not making the required incident
investigation for reporting to the IMO.
(2) Piracy and armed robbery attacks increased
significantly during the period of the COVID19 pandemic.
(3) 86.6 % of the interviewed have several other
roles on board the ship, in addition to SSO, as
safety officers, radio operators, HLO and other
administrative duties, which limits the time
used for security duties.
(4) 26.6 % of them have never had access to the
Ship Security Plan because the vessel and the
master are from other nationalities and do not
trust the SSO.
(5) In all cases where the ship was attacked or
other ships in the proximity were attacked,
the SSO increased the security level to level 2.
(6) It takes two hours or more to the authorities
from the Secretariat of the Navy to arrive to the
place of the attack, to provide help, but by
then, the pirates have left the vessel.
(7) The Port Security Officer and authorities of the
port have never increased the port security
level to level 2, even during the attacks that
resulted with injured people.
(8) 100 % of the participants interviewed SSO
recommended to declare the area “High Risk
Waters (HRA)” for the international maritime
community.
(9) 100 % of the participants interviewed recom
mended that the ports of the area increase the
port security level to operate at level 2 always
and until the number of attacks decrease to an
acceptable security level.
(10) 60 % of the participants interviewed recom
mend vessels sailing in the Southern part of
the Gulf of Mexico to sail at security level 2.
(11) 40 % of the interviewed participants mean that
it is not necessary to increase the security level
of the vessel while sailing in the Southern part
of Gulf of Mexico, but at the anchor area.

(12) 100 % of participants interviewed recommend
to increase the ship security level to level 2
while anchored at the anchor area or whenever
anchored for oil exploration and production
operations.
(13) 73 % of the interviewed says that the autho
rities from the Secretariat of the Navy lack
material resources as high speed patrols and
combustible/fuel to perform vigilance duties.
(14) 100 % of the interviewed participants evaluate
as very bad or none the response of the
Secretariat of the Navy to the armed robbery
and piratical attacks.
(15) 100 % of the interviewed participants believe
that the use of private military security compa
nies will increase the security risk due to the
corruption in the country.
Concerning the documental analysis, the research effort
documented a total of 14 piratical attacks of armed
robbery against vessels during the period of 1 January
to July 30 2020; from these, only three were officially
reported by the attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdic
tion to IMO, these are documented in Table 1, while the
rest are reported with detail in table 2 below.
The documentation of all these pirate attacks and
armed robbery against vessels emphasizes another
very important finding for the entire international mar
itime community, which is the serious underreporting
of this type of maritime security incidents, committed
in the ports of Mexico, its berths, anchorage areas and
territorial waters by the coastal State of Mexico and its
Maritime Authority to IMO.

General discussion
Due to this widespread malpractice of not reporting
pirate attacks and armed robbery against vessels in the
Latin-American region, there are not trustworthy sta
tistics about maritime security incidents for this part of
the globe, to make a realistic comparison with previous
years. Yet, the interviewed SSO coincided that this kind
of attacks against ships increased exponentially during
the pandemic of COVID-19 in 2020 in the area.

Table 1. Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships officially occurred in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, reported by the
attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdiction to IMO and not by the Coastal (Mexico) State, period 1 January-30 July 2020.
Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships officially reported by the attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdiction to IMO and not by the
Coastal State,
(1) REMAS Supply offshore vessel, Italy 2600 g.t. IMO 9,586,459. Incident occurred on 10/04/2020 03:37 UTC. Around 13 nm NW of Puerto Dos Bocas,
Mexico, around 13 nm NW of Puerto Dos Bocas, Mexico, Fired several warning shots, taking the crew as hostages.
(1) TELFORD 28. Barge Carrier Gibraltar. United Kingdom. 13,062 g.t. IMO 8,769,638. Incident occurred on 15/04/2020 03:30 UTC. Around 12 nm North of
Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico 18° 51.94ʹ N, 091° 52.56ʹ W. Around six persons armed with automatic weapons and pistols boarded an anchored barge.
One crew was injured during the incident (shooting with firearm).
(1) SAPURA 3500, Special purpose ship, Panama, 40,845 g.t. IMO 9,651,204. Incident occurred on 04/04/2020 02:06 UTC. HSP Platform, Offshore. Dos
Bocas, Mexico, 18° 37.50ʹ N 093° 19.70ʹ W. Alarm sounded. Accommodation locked down and all crew mustered. Master was able to prevent the boat
from coming alongside by using the thrusters.

to13 February 2020.
Offshore platf. CANTARELL III
03/03/2020
IMO-9,690,999
NN REGULUS
04/03/2020
Anchorage area Isla del
IMO-9,549,176
Carmen, Campeche.
LUM ALFA
IMOMAERSK Transporter, Denmark, 12/04/2020
Platform Garsemi Dos Bocas,
Offshore support vessel
Mexico.
IMO- 9,388,649
Approximately 7 NM north
of Ciudad del Carmen at
18:46 N-091:49 W
Bucanner, Mex
16/04/2020
Offshore supply vessel
01:35
IMO-8,015,831
Glory MODUS
03/05/2020
IMO- 9,325,269
Isla Monserrat, Mexico, Offshore 07/07/2020
18°28.82 N, 93°27.47 W
Supply vessel
23:46
Dos Bocas Mexico
Carson River
13/07/2020
Cd del Carmen,
Offshore Supply vessel,
00:40
Mexico.
Mexico
MMSI 345,070,209
Natalie. Offshore Supply vessel, 24/07/2020
18°18 .33.444 N, 94°
Mexico
02:51 UTC
16 24.924”W
IMO 8,016,110
Coatzacoalcos Veracruz.
Offshore platforms
26/07/2020
18°18 .28.N,
Cahua-Alfa and
23:35:19
94°05 33”W
KosI-Hunter
Located between Dos Bocas
and Coatzacoalcos

Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships documented
through documental analysis
Ship Name, type of ship, Flag Date/Time
Position of the incident
jurisdiction Gross tonnage
IMO Number
2 Fishing vessels
06
Cd del Carmen

Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew.

Boarding, theft, and did not cause any injury. Use of fire weapons.

Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew.

The robbers took crewmembers hostage while ransacking the vessel and stealing valuables. The
robbers released the hostages when they disembarked Not injured people.

Boarding of three pirates shooting with fire weapons. The crew managed to run into the “panic Robbery of 40 ventilators, equipment from
room” to protect themselves. There was not injured persons. It took more than 20 minutes of
the bridge of the platform and personal
verbal protocol to report the incident. The authorities from the Navy arrived several hours later
items of the crew.
only to confirm the incident.

Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew.
Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew.

The robbers took crewmembers hostage while ransacking the vessel and stealing valuables. The
robbers released the hostages when they disembarked Not injured people.
The robbers took crewmembers hostage while ransacking the vessel and stealing valuables. The
robbers released the hostages when they disembarked Not injured people.

Boarding failure

Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew.

The robbers took crewmembers hostage while ransacking the vessel and stealing valuables. The
robbers released the hostages when they disembarked (Clearwater Dynamics, Marine Link
Fleetmon).

Boarding, theft, shotgun and did not cause any mayor injury. Use of Fire arms, handcraft ladder,
small boat overboard shaft.
Boarding. Authorities from the navy managed to reach on time and arrest three persons.

Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew
Robbery of equipment and personal items
of the crew

robbery of product (fish and shrimp), diesel
and personal items.

Boarding and threatening with fire weapons for the robbery of product (fish and shrimp), diesel
and personal items.
Boarding and threatening with fire weapons

Consequences for crew, ship, cargo

Details of the incident

Table 2. Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships occurred in the Southern Gulf of Mexico documented through documental analysis and not officially reported by the Mexican Maritime
Authority to the IMO, period 1 January-30 July 2020.
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An average of 16 piracy and armed robbery attacks
against vessels, MODUS, oil platforms and fishing ships
is registered in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, (Infobae
2019).
The United States through the US MARAD (Maritime
Administration, 2020) launched the Alert 2020–004A,
on Southern Gulf Of Mexico-Vessel Attacks. In this
document, they established that the U.S. government
is aware of at least 20 fishing vessels and 35 oil plat
forms and offshore supply vessels that have been tar
geted by pirates and armed robbers since
January 2018 in the Bay of Campeche area of the
southern Gulf of Mexico and that significant under
reporting of attacks in this area is suspected. The
alert adds that these attacks have involved the dis
charge of firearms, crew injuries, hostage taking, and
theft, according to details provided by the Office of
Naval Intelligence’s on the 30 April 2020 Worldwide
Threat to Shipping (WTS) report (US MARAD).

Similar alerts about this and the related security
risks of the area have been published by other mar
itime administrations worldwide, as the Ship Security
Advisory Alert n. 04–20 by from the Republic of the
Marshall Islands 2020. As well as the alert notice F-410
(DDCM) V.01 from the Maritime Authority of Panama
2020, where they remind “all Panama vessels transiting
the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico and the State of
Tabasco, in the Republic of Mexico to follow the
PIRACY merchant marine circulars procedures and
recommendations. Also, Panama Flag vessels under
the SOLAS V/19 regulation must comply with LRIT
and AIS requirements”.
29 maritime security incidents of this type occurred
in Central and South America during 2019 according to
MSC 4 Circ. 264, ANNEX 3 from IMO (2020b). As
observed in Figure 1 below, it is clearly revealed that
most pirate attacks occurred within territorial waters,
followed by incidents committed in port areas, usually

Figure 1. Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in South and Central America reported in 2019. Source: IMO (2020b).

Figure 2. Flow diagram for attacks in coastal waters & incidents report to IMO. Source: MSC. 1/Circ. 1334 Annex.
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at the anchorage areas while waiting for berth and
only one of them happened in international waters,
at the high seas. Figure 2, shows the flow diagram for
attacks in coastal waters and the respective official
report to IMO.
Yet, if a security incident of this type occurs, it not
only must be officially reported to IMO, but addition
ally, an official investigation must start and be com
pleted to share it with the IMO, so the entire maritime
community can learn from that particular attack.
Resolution A.1025(26) from IMO and adopted on
2 December 2009, on the “Code Of Practice for the
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships,” urges Governments “to implement the
Code of Practice, to investigate all acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships under their jurisdiction,
and to report to the Organization pertinent informa
tion on all investigations and prosecutions relating to
these acts so as to allow lessons to be learned from the
experiences of ship-owners, masters and crews who
have been subject to attacks, thereby enhancing pre
ventative guidance for others who may find them
selves in similar situations in the future”. This circular
also calls Governments to develop international, regio
nal and national agreements and procedures to sim
plify and expedite cooperation for the application of
efficient and effective measures to prevent acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships.
During interviews to various newspapers, representatives
from the Maritime Authority of Mexico underestimated the
gravity of the attacks and said that they were not consid
ered maritime piracy, but rather robbery, since piracy must
occur at the high seas.
Randrianantenaina (2013), discusses the zonal
approach to the concept of maritime piracy as written
in article 101, from the UNCLOS and says that certainly,
it depends on which part of the maritime zones is
perpetrated and adds that:
“Despite the fact that the definition doesn’t specify the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but only the high seas
and a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, it
applies to the EEZ in virtue of article 58(2) of the
LOSC which indicates that articles 88 to 115 (Related
to the high seas) are applicable to the EEZ as far as
they are not contrary to the provisions regarding this
maritime zone. As coastal States exercise only sover
eign rights over non-living and living resources in the
EEZ, it makes the provisions on piracy applicable to
this maritime zone” Randrianantenaina (2013).

Though, the obligation from Government States to
report security incidents to IMO, addresses not only
acts of maritime, but also armed robbery against ves
sels. While several incidents of those documented by
the researchers in the Southern Gulf of Mexico were
committed at the anchorage area of different ports
from the area, several other against MODUS fixed at
the oil field occurred in the EEZ.
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From the information collected during the interviews it
was subtracted that the pirates/robbers are armed with
different type of weapons including assault rifles, shotguns,
pistols, machetes and knives, targeting fixed MODUS and
offshore infrastructure, as well as vessels anchored at the
anchorage area of ports while waiting for berth, but not
ships sailing. Moreover, they operate at night in small
groups of 4 to 15 individuals, aboard several small fiberglass
boats, hulled craft and fishing boats with multiple highpowered outboard motors enabling fast travel to the oil
fields located between five and ninety-five nautical miles
offshore and anchor areas. They use violence to take the
crews as hostages while they steal around the vessel. It was
also revealed that hey carry on frequency radios with access
to the marine control and navy authorities radio bands (L
Band) so they know when they are sailing and approaching
the area to provide security to vessels in distress.
As part of the response from the Mexican Navy to tackle
the problem, on 20 May 2020, the Secretariat of the Navy
launched the “Operacion Refuerzo” (re-strengthening
operation) to improve maritime security in the Campeche
area. Through circular number 1631/2020 the Harbour
Master from Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche, and based
on circular UNICAPAM/DIGACAP/SONDA number 009/
2020 from 20 May 2020, declared the establishment of
“Secured Areas of Anchorage” 2020, which were supposed
to patrolled with the high speed patrols (patrullas intercep
toras) BR-17 Y BR-18 and the oceanic patrol PC ARN
OAXACA PO-161 .
In the same document, the Navy established the official
control measures between vessels and the MRCC. In addi
tion, they required the application of the ISPS Code to fixed
oil-platforms and fixed MODUS, offshore supply vessels
operating under cabotage and other type of vessels of
less of 500 GT serving in the domestic market, including
fishing vessels, but without making the necessary legal
reforms. Thus, that requirement neither was supported by
international law, nor by national law and the shipping
companies and shipmasters were not legally responsible
to follow such “obligation” (Circular n. 872/20-2020).
Nonetheless, participants of this study evaluated as
very poor or non-existent the response by the Mexican
Navy to the security incidents, and affirmed that “the
navy patrols are at berth most of the time, because of the
‘austerity programme’ from the Federal Government to
save fuel and they are only moved after the incidents to
collect the information,” (Respondent n.5). The limited
budget allocated to the Navy by the government of
Mexico might be a result of the lack of a maritime
security policy. The IMO in cooperation with the
World Maritime University delivered a workshop for
the development of the MTP already back in
November, 2018. However, it has not been made yet.
The majority of respondents recommended that
ports of the area increase the security level to operate
at level 2 and that shipmasters increase the ship secur
ity level to level 2 while anchored at the anchor area or
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whenever anchored for oil exploration and production
operations.
These statements concurred with the fact that some
vessels were also attacked at the “secured and guarded
area” by the Secretariat of the Navy of Mexico, as the
case of the Offshore Supply vessel Carson River, of
Mexican flag on 13 July 2020. Indeed while the authors
were doing the last revision of this article, another
armed robbery occurred against the MODUS Coban
A, located some nautical miles from the Port of Dos
Bocas, in Tabasco Mexico, on the night of
24 November 2020. Thus the recommendation from
the respondents concerning the declaration of the
Southern Gulf of Mexico as a High Risk Area (HRA)
seems to be rational in order to increase security mea
sures in the region and allow the international mari
time community to be better prepared to meet these
threats in those high risk waters.
As Bueger (2015) explains, the campaign against
piracy included the work to define the affected territory
and established the called “zones of exception,” which
are special spaces in which particular forms of rules and
regulations apply. Best Management Practices BMP3
(2010), as analysed by Bueger (2015) established that
“the High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by
where the piracy attacks have taken place”.
If the notion of “piracy attacks” is a clearly definable
legal term, the notion of “piracy activity” is more ambig
uous and open to interpretation. “Piracy” is in the BMP4
not defined in legal terms, but as “all acts of violence
against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes armed
robbery and attempts to board and take control of the
ship, wherever this may take place,” Bueger (2015).

Some of the control measures for a HRA include the
establishment of a safe zone for shipping as an
International Recommended Transport Corridor,
which is usually protected by international naval
missions. However, the declaratory of a HRA is
a lengthy process that involves the whole world
maritime community and cooperation with the
Security Council of the United Nations and the
Safety and Security committees from the
International Maritime Organization. Thus in the
meantime, some of the measures included in the
Best Management Practices against piracy and
armed robbery could also be implemented in the
area to a certain extent in order secure ships and its
crews and of course the marine environment, con
sidering that the Campeche Sound is an area with
high offshore activity.

Conclusions
Maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships in the
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico has increased

significantly during the last years; results indicate that
piratical attacks are severely underreported by the
Government of Mexico.
The Maritime Authority from the Government of
Mexico is not fulfilling its duties and obligations
before the international community concerning the
official report of incidents involving acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships, as established in MSC.1/
Circ.1334 from IMO (2009a), neither are they comply
ing with the requirements of the ISPS Code with
regards to the setting of maritime security levels in
accordance with the perceived risk. This prevents
vessels from foreign flags secure their ships and
their crews when entering such risky waters. The
lack of trustworthy statistical figures creates further
difficulties towards the international cooperation for
the implementation of security measures to secure
such waters and ships sailing in the area. It is urgent
that the Government of Mexico improves the security
status of the area by correcting these malpractices
and reports to IMO all acts of piracy and armed
robbery allegedly committed against ships within its
territorial waters and the EEZ.
The lack of a Maritime Transport Policy including
the Maritime Security Policy (MSP) might negatively
affect the security of the region. It is crucial that the
Government of Mexico improves the security of the
area with effective vigilance, changing from a reactive
to a proactive approach.

Recommendations
(1) The development of a Maritime Security Policy
by the Maritime Authority of Mexico, with
respective strategies and specific actions to
secure ports, vessels and their crews is urgent,
including a proper allocation of human material
resources to tackle the problem. The strategy
shall include the combat of logistic infrastruc
ture from pirates both at sea and onshore.
(2) It is highly recommended that ports from the
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico adjust accord
ingly the security level under which they operate.
(3) It is recommended that vessels sailing the
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico remain vig
ilant to security threats and ensure that all antipiracy and armed robbery procedures and mea
sures from the SSP are in effect.
(4) It is highly recommended that vessels anchored
at anchor areas of ports from the Southern part
of the Gulf of Mexico or whenever anchored for
oil exploration and production operations oper
ate under an increased security level.
(5) It is highly recommended to make the necessary
reforms to extent the application of the ISPS
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Code to offshore activities, cabotage and ferries
as previously proposed by Nordfjeld (2018).
(6) It is recommended that special security mea
sures should be considered for implementation
in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico,
including the evaluation of the HRA classifica
tion, as suggested by respondents.
(7) It is recommended the establishment of
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) for interna
tional cooperation and capacity building with the
US Coastguard authorities, to reduce security
threats and protect the marine environment of
the area, since an attack against a MODUS or
a fixed platform would be a marine disaster that
because of the marine streams would easily reach
the US coast.

Abbreviations
AIS
CCTV
CSO
EEZ
IMO
ISM

–
–
–
–
–
–

Automatic identification System
Closed-Circuit Television
Company Security Officer
Exclusive Economic Zone
International Maritime Organization
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety
Management (ISM) Code)
– International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

ISPS
Code
ISSC
PFSA
PFSO
PFSP
PSA
PSO
PSP
SOLAS
SSA
SSAS
SSO
SSP
UN
UNCLOS

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

International Ship Security Certificate
Port Facility Security Assessment
Port Facility Security Officer
Port Facility Security Plan
Port Security Assessment
Port Security Officer
Port Security Plan
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,1974
Ship Security Assessment
Ship Security Alert System
Ship Security Officer
Ship Security Plan
United Nations
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982
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